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Commerce Clause Restraints on State Tax
Incentives
Walter Hellerstein*
INTRODUCTION
The states' provision of tax incentives designed to encour-
age economic development within their borders has long been a
feature of the American legislative landscape. Today every
state provides tax incentives as an inducement to local indus-
trial location and expansion.1 Indeed, scarcely a day goes by
without some state offering yet another tax incentive to spur
economic development,2 often in an effort to attract a particular
enterprise to the state.3
The debate over the efficacy and wisdom of state tax and
other business incentives is intense and important,4 as other
* Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. AB. 1967, Harvard;
J.D. 1970, University of Chicago. This Article draws freely from Walter
Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business
Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1996).
L See Chris Micheli, A 50-State Comparison of Tax Incentives for Manu-
facturing Equipment Purchases, 12 STATE TAX NOTES 1739, 1739 (1997); Mark
L. Nachbar et al., Income Taxes: State Tax Credits and Incentives, 1180 Tax
Mgmt. (BNA) (1994).
2. See, e.g., Russell Garland, State Extends New Tax Break to Investment
Firms, 13 STATE TAX NOTES 226, 226-27 (1997) (describing tax incentives de-
signed "to lure large investment companies" to Rhode Island); Is Bay State's
Harbor Tax Credit 'In for Rough Sledding'? 12 STATE TAX NOTES 947, 947
(1997) (relaying letters to the editor that discuss Massachusetts' corporate
excise tax credit for the federal harbor maintenance tax paid when shipping
into or out of Massachusetts ports).
3. See, e.g., Harriet Hanlon, Steel or Steal? Gulf States Challenges Ala-
bama's Tax Incentives, 9 STATE TAX NOTES 923, 923 (1995) (discussing the
"Mercedes-Benz legislation" that was enacted "to encourage the location of
industrial research facilities in Alabama").
4. Compare, e.g., Richard D. Pomp, The Role of State Tax Incentives in
Attracting and Retaining Business: A View from New York, 29 TAX NOTES 521
(1985) (concluding, after extensive review, that business tax incentives play
only an insignificant role in attracting or maintaining in-state firms and
probably result in a needless loss of state revenue) with Note, Problems with
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articles in this Symposium plainly reveal. My purpose here,
however, is not to enter this fray. Instead, it is to consider the
central legal question that state tax incentives raise under the
dormant Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution: How
is a constitutionally benign tax incentive designed to attract
industry to a state to be distinguished from an unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory tax incentive designed to do the same
thing?
This question reflects a palpable tension in the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause opinions. The Court has declared
that its decisions "do not prevent the States from structuring
their tax systems to encourage the growth and development of
intrastate commerce and industry."5 The Court, however, has
disapproved state tax measures designed to achieve that very
objective on the ground that they "foreclose[] tax-neutral deci-
sions"6 and "'provid[e] a direct commercial advantage to local
business."'7
This Article explores the ill-defined distinction between
the constitutional carrot and the unconstitutional stick in state
tax cases. In examining the restraints that the Commerce
Clause imposes on state tax incentives, the Article canvasses
the general principles limiting discriminatory state taxation,
explores the Court's decisions addressing state tax incentives,
and proposes a framework of analysis for adjudicating the va-
lidity of such incentives. The Article considers the constitu-
tionality of a variety of state tax incentives within the sug-
gested framework. It concludes that many state tax incentives
commonly employed by the states cannot survive Commerce
Clause scrutiny while identifying several categories of state tax
incentives that should pass constitutional muster.
State Aid to New or Expanding Businesses, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1024-25
(1985) (citing a Fortune study showing the practical importance of business
incentives). See also WILLIAM SCHWEKE ET AL., BIDDING FOR BusINESS 35
(1994) (noting the weight of scholarly opinion against using development in-
centives to attract new industry); William J. Barrett VII, Note, A Proposal to
Prohibit Industrial Relocation Subsidies, 72 TEY. L. REV. 669, 712-13 (1994)
(concluding that industrial relocation subsidies are undesirable from an eco-
nomic and political standpoint). See generally Symposium: The Effects of
State and Local Public Policies on Economic Development, NEW ENGLAND
ECON. REV., Mar./Apr. 1997, at 1, 1-147.
5. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977).
6. Id. at 331.
7. Id. at 329 (quoting Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Min-
nesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959)).
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I. STATE TAX INCENTIVES AS STATE TAX
DISCRIMINATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The prohibition against state taxes that discriminate
against interstate commerce has been a fundamental tenet of
the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence from the very be-
ginning.8 The concept of discrimination, however, is not self-
defining, and the Court has never precisely delineated the
scope of the doctrine that bars discriminatory taxes. Nonethe-
less, the central meaning of discrimination as a criterion for
adjudicating the constitutionality of state taxes on interstate
business emerges unmistakably from the Court's decisions: A
tax which by its terms or operation imposes greater burdens on
out-of-state goods, activities, or enterprises than on competing
in-state goods, activities, or enterprises will be struck down as
discriminatory under the Commerce Clause.9
State tax incentives, whether in the form of credits, ex-
emptions, abatements, or other favorable treatment typically
share two features that render them suspect under the rule
barring taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce.
First, state tax incentives single out activities, investments, or
other actions that occur within the taxing state for favorable
treatment. Indeed, if state tax incentives were not limited to
in-state activities, they would hardly be worthy of the appella-
tion "state" tax incentive.
Second, state tax incentives, as integral components of the
state's taxing apparatus, are intimately associated with the co-
ercive machinery of the state. They therefore fall comfortably
within the universe of state action to which the Commerce
Clause is directed. While "Itihe Commerce Clause does not
prohibit all state action designed to give its residents an ad-
vantage in the marketplace,"10 it plainly applies to "action of
8. See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1875) (holding unconstitu-
tional a Missouri statute which required the payment of a license tax from
persons who sold goods not manufactured in Missouri).
9. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117
S. Ct. 1590, 1596 (1997) (invalidating exemption for property owned by chari-
table organizations because exemption excluded organizations operated prin-
cipally for the benefit of nonresidents); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct.
848, 861 (1996) (invalidating intangible property tax on corporate stock that
applied only to the extent that the corporation did business in other states);
Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 654-56 (1994) (invalidating a
statewide use tax on products purchased outside the state insofar as it ex-
ceeded equivalent sales tax on products purchased within the state).
10. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,278 (1988).
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that description in connection with the State's regulation of in-
terstate commerce."11 And the Court has recognized in scores of
cases that state tax laws affecting activities carried on across
state lines are "plainly connected to the regulation of interstate
commerce."
12
II. STATE TAX INCENTIVES AS STATE TAX
DISCRIMINATION: CASE LAW
The Court's treatment of state tax incentives suggests
that the constitutional suspicion surrounding such measures is
well justified. Over the past two decades, the Court has con-
sidered four taxing schemes involving measures explicitly de-
signed to encourage economic activity within the state. 3 In
each case the Court invalidated the measure and did so with
rhetoric so sweeping as to cast a constitutional cloud over all
state tax incentives.
A. BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE
In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,4 the
Court considered the constitutionality of an amendment to a
New York stock-transfer tax that created an incentive designed
to assist the New York brokerage industry. The tax applied to all
transfers of stock regardless of where the sale occurred. Because
the lion's share of stock transfers was effectuated through New
York transfer agents, the tax applied to most stock transfers,
even when the sale was effectuated through a non-New York
broker. To encourage stock purchasers to use New York brokers,
the statute was amended to provide reduced rates for certain
transfers of stock when the sale was effected through New York
brokers. The Court found that this reduction in tax liability,
designed to encourage in-state business activity, offended the
Commerce Clause's nondiscrimination principle.
11. Id.
12. Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envt'l Quality, 511 U.S.
93, 107 n.9 (1994); see also Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 455 (1886) ("A
discriminatory tax... is, in effect, a regulation in restraint of commerce
among the States.").
13. See New Energy Co. 486 U.S. at 271-73; Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.
Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265 (1984); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S.
388, 390 (1984); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 323-
24 (1977).
14. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
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Prior to the statute's amendment, the New York transfer
tax was "neutral as to in-state and out-of-state sales"15 because,
regardless of where the sale occurred, the same tax applied to
all securities transferred through a New York transfer agent.
The amendment, however, "upset this equilibrium"16 because a
seller's decision as to where to sell would no longer be made
"solely on the basis of nontax criteria."1 7 Instead, a seller would
be induced to trade through a New York broker to reduce his or
her transfer tax liability.
By providing a tax incentive for sellers to deal with New
York rather than out-of-state brokers, the state had, in the
Court's eyes, "foreclose[d] tax-neutral decisions."18 Moreover, it
had done so through the coercive use of its taxing authority.
As the Court noted, "the State us[ed] its power to tax an in-
state operation as a means of requiring other business operations
to be performed in the home State."19
Because tax incentives, by their nature, are designed to
"foreclose tax-neutral decisions" by bringing "tax criteria" to
bear on business decision making, courts could easily read Bos-
ton Stock Exchange to mean that a constitutional infirmity af-
flicts every state tax incentive. Perhaps for this reason, the
Court felt moved to observe that its "decision... does not prevent
the States from structuring their tax systems to encourage the
growth and development of intrastate commerce and industry."20
The Court did not explain, however, how states could effec-
tively pursue this objective under the constraints of its reasoning
in Boston Stock Exchange.
B. BACCHUS
In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,2 1 the Court encountered
an exemption from Hawaii's excise tax on wholesale liquor
sales for certain locally produced alcoholic beverages. It was
"undisputed that the purpose of the exemption was to aid Hawaii
industry."' This benign purpose, however, could not sanctify a
tax incentive that unmistakably defied the prohibition against
15. Id. at 330.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 336.
20. Id.
21. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
22. Id. at 271.
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taxes that favor in-state over out-of-state products. However
legitimate the goal of stimulating local economic development,
the Court explained, "the Commerce Clause stands as a limi-
tation on the means by which a State can constitutionally seek
to achieve that goal."23 It was "irrelevant to the Commerce
Clause inquiry that the motivation of the legislature was the
desire to aid the makers of locally produced beverages rather
than to harm out-of-state producers."24
The Court in Bacchus recognized that "a State may enact
laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
effect of encouraging domestic industry"25 and even declared
"that competition among the States for a share of interstate
commerce is a central element of our free-trade policy."2 6 It
was also true, however, that "the Commerce Clause limits the
manner in which the States may legitimately compete for in-
terstate trade."27 Beyond reiterating the ban on discriminatory
taxation and applying it to strike down the Hawaii tax, how-
ever, the Court offered no new counsel on how far the Com-
merce Clause prohibition extends.
C. WESTINGHOUSE
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully28  arose out of New
York's response to Congress's provision of tax incentives for
American corporations to increase their exports. In 1971, Con-
gress accorded preferred status to any entity that qualified as a
"Domestic International Sales Corporation" (DISC). 29 Under
the federal tax laws, DISCs were not taxable on their income,
and their shareholders were taxable on only a portion of such
income. If New York had incorporated the federal DISC legis-
lation into its corporate income tax, it would have suffered a
substantial loss of revenue." On the other hand, if New York
23. Id.
24. Id. at 273.
25. Id. at 271.
26. Id. at 272.
27. Id.
28. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
29. See I.R.C. §§ 991-97 (1988). In 1984, Congress largely repealed the
DISC legislation and replaced it with special provisions governing new enti-
ties it described as foreign sales corporations (FSCs). See I.R.C. §§ 921-27
(1996).
30. See Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 392 (explaining that a budget analyst
reported to the legislature that a loss of revenue could amount to 20 to 30
million dollars each year).
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had sought to tax DISC income in full, it risked discouraging
the manufacture of export goods within the state.
31
With these conflicting considerations in mind, New York
enacted legislation that did two things: first, it provided that a
DISC's income be combined with the income of its parent for
state tax purposes; second, in an effort to "'provide a positive
incentive for increased business activity in New York State,'"32
it adopted a partial credit for the parent against the tax on the
federally exempt DISC income included in the New York tax
base. 33 The credit was limited, however, by reference to the
percent of DISC receipts from export shipments from New
York.34 As a result, New York taxed the income attributable to
export shipments from New York at thirty percent of the rate
applicable to income attributable to export shipments from
other states.
After examining the operation of New York's DISC credit
scheme,35 the Court in Westinghouse found that New York's ef-
fort to encourage export activity in the state suffered from con-
stitutional infirmities similar to those that had disabled New
York's earlier effort to encourage brokerage activity in the
state. Like the reduction in tax liability offered to sellers of se-
curities who effectuated their sales in New York, the reduction
in tax liability offered to exporters who effectuated their ship-
ments from New York" creates... an advantage' for firms op-
erating in New York by placing 'a discriminatory burden on
commerce to its sister States.' "36 It was "irrelevant"37 to the
31. See id. at 392-93.
32. Id. at 393 (quoting (NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF THE BUDGET, Re-
port on A.12108-A and S.10544) (May 23, 1972), reprinted in Bill Jacket of
1972 (N.Y. Laws, ch. 778, p. 18).
33. See id. A corporation's New York business allocation percentage,
which is employed to determine the amount of a multistate taxpayer's income
that is fairly attributable to New York, is determined by taking the average of
the ratio of the taxpayer's property, payroll, and receipts in New York to its
total property, payroll, and receipts wherever located. N.Y. TAX LAW § 210.3
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995).
34. See Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 393-94 (explaining the method of com-
puting DISC credit).
35. The Court explained the effect of the DISC credit scheme in detail
employing, among other things, a series of hypothetical examples demonstrat-
ing that "similarly situated corporations operating a wholly-owned DISC in
New York would face different tax assessments in New York depending on the
location from which the DISC shipped its exports." Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at
400 n.9.
36. Id. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S.
318, 331 (1977)).
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constitutional analysis that the earlier tax incentives the Court
had considered "involved transactional taxes rather than taxes
on general income"" because a State cannot "circumvent the
prohibition of the Commerce Clause against placing burden-
some taxes on out-of-state transactions by burdening those
transactions with a tax that is levied in the aggre-
gate... rather than on individual transactions."39 Nor did it
matter "[w]hether the discriminatory tax diverts new business
into the State or merely prevents current business from being
diverted elsewhere"; ° it is "still a discriminatory tax that
'forecloses tax-neutral decisions.'" 4
D. NEWENERGY
The Court's most recent encounter with a state tax incen-
tive involved an Ohio tax credit designed to encourage the pro-
duction of ethanol (ethyl alcohol) in the state. Ethanol, which is
typically made from corn, can be mixed with gasoline to pro-
duce the motor fuel called "gasohol." Ohio provided a credit
against the state's motor fuel tax for each gallon of ethanol sold
as a component of gasohol, but only if the ethanol was pro-
duced in Ohio or in a state that granted similar tax benefits to
Ohio-produced ethanol.
In New Energy Co. v. Limbach,42 the Court had little diffi-
culty concluding that this tax incentive failed to satisfy the
strictures of the Commerce Clause. It observed that the Ohio
provision at issue "explicitly deprives certain products of gen-
erally available beneficial tax treatment because they are made
in certain other States, and thus on its face appears to violate
the cardinal requirement of nondiscrimination."43 As for the
claim that Ohio could have achieved the same objective by way
of a cash subsidy, the Court responded that the Commerce
Clause does not prohibit all state action favoring local over out-
of-state interests, but only such action that arises out of the
state's regulation of interstate commerce." While "[d]irect
37. Id. at 404.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 406.
4L Id. (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comnm'n, 429 U.S. 318,
331 (1977)).
42. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
43. Id. at 274.
44. See id. at 278.
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subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run
afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state
manufacturer does."45
I. STATE TAX INCENTIVES AS STATE TAX
DISCRIMINATION: ANALYSIS
A. GiVING THE COURT'S LANGUAGE FULL SWAY
What, then, does the case law teach us about the constitu-
tionality of state tax incentives under the Commerce Clause? A
literal focus on key passages in the Court's opinions might well
suggest that "all state inducement programs are likely to be
unconstitutional."46 After all, it is the rare state tax incentive
that results in "tax-neutral decisions"47 made "solely on the
basis of nontax criteria."
48
Consider state income taxes. Almost no state income tax
incentive-and there are hundreds of them across the country-
meets the Court's ostensible requirement of strict geographic
neutrality. Alabama, for example, provides an income tax
credit for new investment, but only if it occurs in Alabama; 49
Alaska provides an income tax credit for investment in gas
processing and mineral development facilities, but only if they
are built in Alaska;5  Arizona provides an income tax credit for
taxpayers that increase research activities in Arizona;51 Arkan-
sas provides an income tax credit for any motion picture pro-
duction company that spends more than a specified amount
producing films in Arkansas;52 California provides an income
tax credit for qualified property placed in service in California; 3
Colorado provides an income tax credit for investment in quali-
fying Colorado property;54 Connecticut provides an income tax
credit for investing in certain new manufacturing facilities in
Connecticut;55 Delaware provides an income tax credit for in-
45. Id.
46. Note, supra note 4, at 1049.
47. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Conm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977).
48. Id.
49. See ALA. CODE § 41-23-24(a) (1991).
50. See ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.042 (Michie 1996).
5L See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1168 (West Supp. 1996).
52. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-4-206 (Michie 1992).
53. See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 23649 (West Supp. 1997).
54. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-507.6 (1994).
55. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-217e (West Supp. 1997).
1997]
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vesting in qualified new business facilities in Delaware;5 6
Florida provides an income tax credit for investments in Flor-
ida export finance corporations;"7 Georgia provides an income
tax credit for taxpayers that increase employment by five or
more in designated counties in Georgia. 8 The list goes on and
on.
59
By providing a tax benefit for in-state investment that is
not available for identical out-of-state investment, these incen-
tives skew a taxpayer's decision in favor of the former. Each
such incentive-in purpose and effect--diverts new business
into the State. 6° Put another way, these incentives deprive
out-of-state investments "of generally available beneficial tax
treatment because they are made in... other States, and thus
on [their]... face appear[] to violate the cardinal requirement
of nondiscrimination."
6
'
A similar analysis jeopardizes almost every sales and
property tax incentive designed to encourage economic devel-
opment in the taxing state. Yet most states offer just such in-
centives. Some states provide sales and use tax exemptions (or
credits or refunds) for sales of property purchased for con-
struction of new or improved facilities within the state; others
give favorable sales or use tax treatment to property purchased
in connection with the relocation or expansion of a business in
the state; still others provide sales and use tax exemptions for
property used in an enterprise zone within the state.62 Simi-
larly, a number of states provide property tax incentives for
new or expanded facilities in the state.63 Given the near uni-
versality of state sales taxation in this country,64 and the true
universality of local property taxation, sales or property tax
56. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 2011(a) (1985).
57. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.188 (West 1989).
58. See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-40(e) (Supp. 1997).
59. One could continue to proceed alphabetically through the states with
similar examples. See 1 Multistate Corp. Income Tax Guide (CCH) 180
(1997) (listing current tax credits allowed by each state); Nachbar et al., supra
note 1 (discussing income tax credits available to businesses in each state).
60. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 406 (1984).
61. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988).
62. See generally 1 Multistate Sales Tax Guide (CCH) 975 (1997)
(listing state tax incentives for investment in industry).
63. See [2 All States] State Tax Guide (CCH) 20-200 to 20-964 (1997)
(listing all property taxes and tax exemptions by state).
64. Forty-five states and the District of Columbia impose a retail sales
tax. See id. 1 60-100 (tabulating state tax rates for retail sale of tangible per-
sonal property).
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breaks for investment within the state or locality affect many
taxpayers' business location decisions. All other things being
equal, a rational taxpayer will allocate its resources in a man-
ner that maximizes its after-tax profits; hence it will steer its
investments toward the states which offer such tax benefits.
Sales and property tax incentives, like income tax incentives,
are therefore subject to attack on the ground that they offend
the "free trade" purposes of the Commerce Clause65 by inducing
resources to be allocated among the states on the basis of tax
rather than nontax criteria.
B. AN ALTERNATivE READING OF THE COURT'S OPINIONS
1. The Justification for a More Restrained Approach
The astonishing implications of a literal reading of the
Court's pronouncements should give us pause. Nonetheless,
the four cases in which the Court has considered and struck
down state tax incentives make it clear that the Court's rheto-
ric cannot be dismissed as empty. In its decisions, the Court
revealed a willingness to subject a wide array of fiscal meas-
ures to exacting scrutiny, striking down sales, income, and
transaction taxes. The Court likewise showed no mercy to any
form of tax break, invalidating rate reductions,66 exemptions,67
and credits.68 Moreover, the four opinions were written by
Justices whose attitudes toward the dormant Commerce
Clause span the spectrum from the highly protective "free
trade" views of Justice White (Boston Stock Exchange and Bac-
chus) to the more moderate views of Justice Blackmun
(Westinghouse) to the unabashed hostility of Justice Scalia
(New Energy).69 Even more significantly, the Justices acted in
these cases with an extraordinary degree of consensus. There
was not a single dissent on the merits of the Commerce Clause
65. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 403 (1984) (quoting
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977)).
66. See Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1997). For a discus-
sion of Boston Stock Exchange see supra Part H.L
67. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984). For a
discussion of Bacchus, see supra Part I.B.
68. See Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 407. For a discussion of Westinghouse
see supra Part 11.C. See also New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279-
80 (1988). For a discussion of New Energy see supra Part II.D.
69. See Walter Hellerstein, Justice Scalia and the Commerce Clause: Re-
flections of a State Tax Lawyer, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1763 (1991) (reviewing
Justice Scalia's Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
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issue in any one of the Court's four state tax incentive deci-
sions. 70 In short, these cases and the doctrine they espouse
must-to say the least-be taken seriously.
With that fact in mind, I nevertheless believe that these
opinions can-and should-be read less expansively than much
of their literal language permits. My view rests in part on an
instinctive sense that virtually all state tax incentives cannot
really be unconstitutional. Such incentives, after all, constitute
long-standing, familiar, and central features of every state's
taxing system. Even more important, a somewhat narrower
interpretation of the Court's opinions is, in my judgment, more
consonant with accepted dormant Commerce Clause policy and
the core rationales of the incentive decisions themselves. I rec-
ognize that one may question any effort to cabin the language
of the Court's opinions, given that the Court itself has never
displayed concern with their broad rationale. Like others,71
however, I believe that the lethal swath an unrestrained
reading of the Court's tax incentive opinions would cut across
state tax regimes warrants a serious effort to offer a more mod-
erate alternative.
2. The In-State Favoritism/State-Coercion Rationale
In my judgment, two core principles, which were identified
at the outset of this discussion,72 underlie the Court's state tax
incentive decisions and should guide their proper interpreta-
tion. First, the provision must favor in-state over out-of-state
activities; second, the provision must implicate the coercive
power of the state. If, but only if, both of these conditions are
met, courts should declare the tax unconstitutional.
All four of the Court's tax incentive decisions fall com-
fortably within this analytical framework. First, in each of the
four cases, the state favored in-state over out-of-state activities:
in-state over out-of-state sales in Boston Stock Exchange; in-
70. Boston Stock Exchange, Westinghouse, and New Energy were unani-
mous decisions, and the sole dissent in Bacchus rested exclusively on the
ground that the Commerce Clause was inapplicable because the Twenty-first
Amendment removed Commerce Clause restraints from state regulation and
taxation of intoxicating liquors.
71. See Philip M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An Analytical
Approach to State Tax Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND.
L. REV. 879, 928-37 (1986) (expressing concern that a broad interpretation of
the Courfs tax incentive opinions would invalidate a great majority of state
tax incentives).
72. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
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state over out-of-state production in Bacchus and New Energy;
and in-state over out-of-state exportation in Westinghouse.
Second, in each of the four cases, the coercive power of the
state gave the tax incentive its bite. In Boston Stock Exchange,
taxpayers would pay higher stock transfer taxes unless they
engaged in in-state sales. In Bacchus and New Energy, tax-
payers would pay higher liquor wholesaling or motor fuel taxes
unless they sold products manufactured in the state. In West-
inghouse, taxpayers would pay higher income taxes unless
their DISCs shipped their exports from within the state.
That each of these cases comes out the same way under
the in-state-favoritism/state-coercion approach reveals that it
provides no panacea for state taxing authorities. Indeed, many
tax incentives will fail to survive scrutiny under this reading of
the Court's tax incentive decisions. At least one significant
category of tax incentives, however, should escape invalidation:
those tax incentives that are framed not as exemptions from or
reductions of existing state tax liability but rather as exemptions
from or reductions of additional state tax liability to which the
taxpayer would be subjected only if the taxpayer were to en-
gage in the targeted activity in the state. In my judgment,
such incentives neither favor in-state over out-of-state invest-
ment (except in a sense that should be constitutionally irrele-
vant) nor do they rely on the coercive power of the state to
compel a choice favoring in-state investment.
A real property tax exemption for new construction in a
state, for example, favors in-state over out-of-state investment
only if one takes account of the taxing regimes of other states
and assumes that a tax would be due if the property were con-
structed in such other state. But the Court generally has re-
fused to consider other states' taxing regimes in determining
the constitutionality of a state's taxing statutes. As the Court
has explained, "[tihe immunities implicit in the Commerce
Clause and the potential taxing power of a State can hardly be
made to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on the shifting
incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States at a
particular moment."73 If a state's taxing statute must stand or
fall on its own terms, a real property tax exemption for new
construction in a state would pass muster because no addi-
tional tax liability could be presumed to result from new con-
73. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946); see also Armco, Inc. v.
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45 (1984) (noting the "shifting complexities" of
the various state tax codes).
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struction outside the state. By contrast, each of the tax meas-
ures at issue in the Court's tax incentive cases resulted in dif-
ferential tax liability that was created entirely by the state's
own taxing regime, depending on whether the taxpayer en-
gaged in in-state or out-of-state activities.
Moreover, insofar as the Court has looked to other states'
taxing regimes to determine their constitutionality under the
Commerce Clause, it has done so only to assure that the tax is
"internally consistent." Under the Court's internal consistency
doctrine, a tax must not impose a greater burden on interstate
commerce than on intrastate commerce on the assumption that
the levy is imposed by every state.74 As the Court has ex-
plained, "[tihis test asks nothing about the degree of economic
reality reflected by the tax, but simply looks to the structure of
the tax at issue to see whether its identical application by
every State in the Union would place interstate commerce at a
disadvantage as compared with commerce intrastate."5 A
property tax exemption for new construction in a state would
pass the internal consistency test because one would have to
assume that every other state offered the same exemption, and,
under this assumption, intrastate commerce would be treated
no better than interstate commerce.
Beyond the lack of a constitutionally significant favoritism
for local over interstate commerce, a property tax exemption
for new construction does not implicate the coercive power of
the state, at least not in a way that can fairly be characterized
as "the State's regulation of interstate commerce."76  By
adopting such an exemption, the state is saying, in effect:
"Come to our state and we will not saddle you with any addi-
tional property tax burdens. Moreover, should you choose not
to accept our invitation, nothing will happen to your tax bill-
at least nothing that depends on our taxing regime."
The state's posture in such circumstances stands in contrast
to its posture in the tax incentive cases the Court has con-
fronted in the past. In each of those cases the state was saying,
in effect: "You are already subject to our taxing power because
74. See generally Walter Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?:
Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 138 (1988).
75. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185
(1995).
76. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,278 (1988) (emphasis omit-
ted).
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you have engaged in taxable activity in this state. If you would
like to reduce those burdens, you may do so by directing addi-
tional business activity into this state. Should you decline our
invitation, we will continue to exert our taxing power over you
as before, and your tax bill might even go up."
These two messages are very different. The latter, but not
the former, reflects a use of the taxing power to coerce in-state
business activity. In other words, there is a constitutionally
significant difference between telling a taxpayer that it will de-
crease its after-tax cost of doing business in a state by engaging
in particular activity in the state and telling a taxpayer that it
will not increase its after-tax cost of doing business by doing
business in the state.
a. Problems With the In-State-Favoritism/State-Coercion
Rationale
I recognize that the suggested reading of the Court's tax
incentive decisions is not above criticism, and that one may
question whether the limiting principles suggested above are
intellectually defensible. Two major objections come readily to
mind. First, one can argue that there is no basis in the Court's
decisions for distinguishing tax incentives involving invitations
to engage in additional in-state activity from tax incentives
that utilize "existing" tax liability to coerce in-state activity. In
my view, however, the Court's own language supports the co-
ercion-based analysis offered above. The Court has declared
that states may "structur[e] their tax systems to encourage the
growth and development of intrastate commerce and industry.""
What a state may not do, by contrast, is to "us[e] its power to
tax an in-state operation as a means of 'requiring [other] busi-
ness operations to be performed in the home State.' " The co-
ercion-centered analysis, I believe, simultaneously responds to
these twin commands of the high Court.
The suggested distinction between coercive and noncoer-
cive tax incentives also finds support in the Court's recent de-
cision in Camps/Newfound Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harri-
son. 9 In Camps/Newfound, the Court held that a Maine
property tax exemption limited to charitable institutions that
served mostly state residents discriminated against interstate
77. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997).
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commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.80 In so hold-
ing, the Court addressed the taxing authority's contention that
the exemption should be sustained because it was no different
in substance from discriminatory subsidies to which the Court
had given its general approval in other cases.81 In rejecting
that argument, the Court reiterated the point it had made on
two previous occasions:
The Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed
to give its residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action
of that description in connection with the State's regulation of inter-
state commerce. Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not
ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory taxa-
tion ... doesA2
By reaffirming its view that there is a significant constitu-
tional distinction between taxes, which are generally regarded
as coercive, and subsidies, which are not, the Court lends
weight to the constitutional basis for the distinction articulated
above between coercive and noncoercive state tax incentives.
Second, one might say that there is no functional differ-
ence between the "carrot" of offering relief from additional tax
liability attributable to activity in which the state is inviting
the taxpayer to engage and the "stick" of threatening maximi-
zation of existing tax liability attributable to activity in which
the taxpayer already is engaged. For example, if one's ex ante
assumption is that the taxpayer has engaged in none of the ac-
tivity that gives rise to tax liability in cases like Boston Stock
Exchange, Bacchus, Westinghouse, or New Energy, the analysis
suggested above ought to dictate a different result in those
cases. For example, if the taxpayer in Boston Stock Exchange
was contemplating the sale of stock with transfer through a
non-New York agent, or if the taxpayers in Bacchus and New
Energy had never made any taxable wholesale liquor sales in
Hawaii or taxable motor fuel sales in Ohio, or if the taxpayer in
Westinghouse had not previously engaged in income-producing
activity in New York, then one could articulate the state's ap-
peal to the taxpayers in those cases in the following terms:
80. Id. at 1606.
81. For example, in New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988),
the Court declared that "[dlirect subsidization of domestic industry does not
ordinarily run afoul of' the Commerce Clause prohibition barring taxes that
discriminate against interstate commerce. And in West Lynn Creamery, Inc.
v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994), the Court repeated that observation.
82. Camps/Newfound, 117 S. Ct. at 1606 (quoting New Energy, 486 U.S.
at 278).
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"Come to our state and we will not saddle you with any addi-
tional tax burdens or at least not with the same tax burdens
that we would ordinarily impose upon taxpayers engaging in
such activity. Moreover, should you refuse our invitation,
nothing will happen to your tax bill-at least nothing that depends
on our taxing regime." This, of course, is the state position that
has already been characterized as not "coercing" in-state activ-
ity, because the taxpayer was not already subject to the state's
tax power. Thus, the argument may prove too much, by vindi-
cating the very taxing regimes the Court struck down in its tax
incentive decisions.
Put another way, the distinction between selectively for-
giving taxes otherwise due if a taxpayer engages in in-state ac-
tivity and disclaiming the right to impose any taxes on a "virgin"
tax base a state is seeking to attract may be a distinction that
turns entirely on whether a particular taxpayer has previously
engaged in some taxable activity in the state. This may be too thin
a distinction to carry the constitutional weight I am asking it
to bear.
Although this line of criticism has some merit, and should
and does enter into the analysis of the constitutionality of par-
ticular tax incentives,83 it should be rejected as a blanket ob-
jection to the proposed approach because it ignores and distorts
the real-world context in which tax incentives operate and,
therefore, must be evaluated.84 It is theoretically possible that
a generally coercive tax incentive may, as to a particular tax-
payer, be noncoercive and that a generally noncoercive tax in-
centive may, as to a particular taxpayer, be coercive. But these
exceptions should not be permitted to swallow the rule, which
ought to reflect the expected impact of the tax incentive on
most taxpayers.
In short, the determination of whether a tax incentive is
coercive should depend on its "practical or economic effect"85
and on "economic realities."86 To let the analysis turn on the
83. See infra Part IV (discussing specific implications of state tax incen-
tives).
84. It is a central tenet of the Court's contemporary Commerce Clause
jurisprudence that the validity of state taxes should be determined on the ba-
sis of their practical economic impact. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977) (rejecting the idea that a state tax on the
"priviledge of doing business" is per se unconstitutional because no economic
consequence necessarily follows from the use of those words).
85. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 262 (1989).
86. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 295 (1987)
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remote possibility that a generally coercive tax incentive may
be noncoercive in a few instances or that a generally noncoer-
cive tax incentive may be coercive on occasion would allow the
tail to wag the dog. It also would defeat the notion that
"commerce among the states is not a technical legal conception,
but a practical one, drawn from the course of business."87
In the end, I remain convinced that there is something to
the distinction delineated above. Perhaps it is best captured
by focusing on the nature of the constitutional injury alleged in
the two different contexts. In the situation addressed by the
Court in its tax incentive decisions, the alleged injury is the
greater tax that the taxpayer will pay in the taxing state if it
fails to engage in the targeted activity within the state, but
rather conducts that activity in other states. When, on the
other hand, there is no preexisting tax base that the state is of-
fering to reduce (but rather only a potential tax base that the
state proposes to tax at lower than ordinary rates or not at all),
the alleged injury is the greater tax the taxpayer will have to
pay in other states, based on the presumed existence of a tax on
the targeted activity in such states. I know of no principle,
however, that requires remediation of this sort of "injury" un-
der the dormant Commerce Clause.88
(quoting Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279).
87. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905).
88. This point is reinforced by considerations of causation. The taxpayer
who challenges a tax incentive on the ground that its choice to engage in activ-
ity outside the incentive-granting state has a tax cost (in the form of foregone
reduction of tax liability) within that state is complaining of an identifiable
injury caused by the state's taxing regime. It therefore is stating a claim that
falls within familiar boundaries-the defendant has caused it injury by deny-
ing it a right, the alleged right to a tax benefit for engaging in certain activity
irrespective of the situs of such activity. By contrast, the taxpayer who chal-
lenges a tax incentive on the ground that its choice to engage in activity out-
side the incentive-granting state has a tax cost based on the assumption that
it will pay taxes in other states is not complaining of an identifiable injury
caused by the incentive-granting state's tax regime. Rather it is complaining
of an injury allegedly caused by an actor other than the defendant. Cf. Ta-
tarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 71, at 937 (noting the difficulty of argu-
ing that a state offering the incentive is burdening the party who chooses to
also operate in a non-incentive state).
As a practical matter, this explains why a challenge to a state tax incen-
tive that does not involve a claim of a right to a reduction of existing tax liabil-
ity is unlikely to be successful. Consider a taxpayer who wishes to challenge a
State A real property tax exemption for new construction in State A. Assume
that the taxpayer has a preexisting taxable facility in State A and has just
constructed a new, taxable facility in State B, which would have qualified for
the exemption if constructed in State A. Since State A has not offered anyone
a reduction in existing property taxes for constructing a new facility in State
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Accordingly, the line between coercive and noncoercive tax
incentives is meaningful and comports with longstanding
principles of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. In my view, analysis of tax incentives built on this dis-
tinction thus makes far more sense than a free-wheeling doc-
trine based only on the vague admonition that a state may not
"foreclose[] tax-neutral decisions."89
IV. STATE TAX INCENTIVES AS STATE TAX
DISCRIMINATION: SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS
The question remains as to how the existing pattern of
state and local tax incentives fares under the modes of analysis
identified above. The final section of the Article assesses the
constitutionality of various types of state tax within that ana-
lytical framework.
A. INcoME TAx INCENTIVES
1. Credits
The most common form of state tax incentive in this coun-
try is the income tax credit. As the litany of income tax credits
described above indicates, 90 virtually all such credits tie the tax
benefit offered by the state to specific in-state activity, whether
it be the investment in in-state property, the hiring of in-state
employees, or the expansion of in-state facilities. Accordingly,
under the broadest reading of the Court's state tax incentive
decisions, these credits cannot survive scrutiny because they
fail the test of strict "tax neutrality" that the Court articulated
in Boston Stock Exchange and its progeny.91
A, a court is unlikely to find that the taxpayer has stated a cause of action
against State A under the Commerce Clause based on the fact that, prior to
State A's offering of the tax exemption, the taxpayer engaged in taxable activ-
ity in State A. Moreover, the taxpayer's State A tax liability clearly was unaf-
fected by the fact that the facility was constructed in State B. Indeed, insofar
as there is any substance to the taxpayer's complaint to State A about unfair
treatment vis-h-vis other State A taxpayers who have constructed new facili-
ties in State A, the claim would appear to implicate Equal Protection rather
than Commerce Clause concerns, because it involves a tax classification dif-
ferentiating two forms of intrastate activity.
89. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977).
90. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
91. See supra Part II (discussing the Courtes analysis of four tax incentive
schemes); W. Eugene Seago & Wayne M. Schell, Tax Credits and the Com-
merce Clause After Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 3 J. STATE TAX'N 101,
111-12 (1984) (noting the success of taxpayer challenges to state tax credits);
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State income tax credits similarly fail to pass muster un-
der the narrower reading of the Court's tax incentive decisions
I have offered above. Such credits violate the two principles
that I have identified as central to the Commerce Clause
analysis of the validity of state tax incentives: first, they favor
in-state over out-of-state activity because income tax credits are
almost invariably confined to the former; second, they impli-
cate the coercive power of the state, because the taxpayer can
reduce its state tax bill only by engaging in in-state activity.
2. Deductions
Income tax deductions limited (or granted on more favor-
able terms) to in-state as compared to out-of-state activities are
functionally indistinguishable from income tax credits confined
to in-state activities.92 They therefore stand or fall according to
the analysis set forth above.
A Wisconsin controversy over income tax deductions re-
stricted to in-state property is illustrative. In keeping with its
general conformity to the Internal Revenue Code in determining
taxable income, Wisconsin has adopted the federal depreciation
rules. In particular, the Wisconsin statutes permitted depre-
ciation deductions for property located in Wisconsin to be taken
Joel Michael, The Constitutionality of Minnesota's Business Tax Credits After
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 4 J. STATE TAX'N 163, 170-79 (1985) (analyzing
the impact of Westinghouse on various Minnesota tax incentive cases). Many
state tax credits are in fact limited to qualifying activities that take place in
particular locations within a state (for example, enterprise zones), and it
might be argued that such credits do not discriminate against interstate
commerce because they deny tax benefits to in-state as well as out-of-state
activity that is not conducted within the specified in-state location. This ar-
gument, however, cannot be maintained in light of cases holding that dis-
crimination against interstate commerce is not rendered constitutionally ac-
ceptable by the fact that some intrastate commerce is subject to the same
discrimination that is visited upon interstate commerce. See C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1682 (1994) (finding ordinance
discriminates if it disfavors certain in-town and in-state waste processors);
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (finding it immaterial
that city ordinance disfavored out of town milk pasturizers as well as those
involved in interstate commerce); cf. United Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council
v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) (finding city affirmative
action ordinance for city construction projects subject to challenge under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause). As the Court declared in Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981), "We need not know how unequal the [tlax
is before concluding that it unconstitutionally discriminates."
92. I recognize, of course, that for purposes other than those under con-
sideration here, there may be significant differences between deductions and
credits (for example, their impact on the progressivity of a tax).
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according to the favorable federal Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS)93 applicable to business-investment property.
For the tax years in question, however, accelerated depreciation
was not available for property located outside Wisconsin; in-
stead, such property had to be depreciated according to the
slower (and, therefore, less favorable) methods provided by an
earlier version of federal law.9
4
The limitation of ACRS depreciation to in-state property
might well be viewed as designed "to encourage the growth and
development of intrastate commerce and industry."95 Relying
on Boston Stock Exchange and Westinghouse, however, the
Wisconsin Tax Appeals Connission concluded that providing
lower effective income tax rates to taxpayers who made in-state
rather than out-of-state investments violated the Commerce
Clause prohibition against discriminatory taxation. 96  The
Commission found a "clear parallel"97 to the discrimination the
Court condemned in Westinghouse because:
the Wisconsin depreciation deduction statutes at issue are obviously
"designed to have discriminatory economic effects" on corporations
locating depreciable property outside the state by taxing such corpo-
rations more heavily than those locating such property in the state.98
The favorable depreciation deduction for investment in
Wiscongin property would likewise fail to pass muster under the
more focused reading of the Court's state tax incentive deci-
sions delineated above. The Wisconsin depreciation deduction
violated both guiding principles that I believe should govern
Commerce Clause analysis of the validity of state tax incen-
tives: it favored in-state over out-of-state activity, and it impli-
cated the coercive power of the state, because the taxpayer
could obtain the maximum reduction in its Wisconsin tax bill
only by engaging in in-state activity.
93. See I.R.C. § 168 (1994).
94. See I.R.C. § 167 (1988).
95. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318,336 (1977).
96. See Beatrice Cheese, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, (Wis. Tax
Appeals Conm'n Feb. 24, 1993) [1990-93 Transfer Binder] Wis. Tax Rep.
(CCH) 203-396 (finding a violation of the Commerce Clause by two Wiscon-
sin statutes outlining approved corporate deductions).
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 406-07
(1984)).
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3. Apportionment Formulas
There is one category of income tax incentives that seems
to enjoy smooth sailing under the Court's precedents, although
it is not obvious why this should be so. 9 Most states employ a
three-factor formula based on property, payroll, and sales to
apportion income among the states for tax purposes. 00 As
originally conceived, the three-factor formula gave equal
weight to each of these factors. 101 Under this mode of appor-
tionment, a taxpayer's income is attributed to the state by a
percentage determined by averaging the ratios of the tax-
payer's property, payroll, and sales, within the state to its prop-
erty, payroll, and sales everywhere. 2 In recent years, how-
ever, there has been a decided trend toward adoption of
apportionment formulas that give additional significance to the
sales factor, often by doubling its weight in the determination
of the apportionment percentage'013 and, in one instance, by
eliminating the other factors altogether.'0 4
The justification typically offered for giving additional
weight to the sales factor in income tax apportionment formu-
las is that it will stimulate local economic development. Spe-
cifically, it encourages multistate taxpayers with sales spread
throughout the nation to locate their property and payroll
within the state on the theory that the extra weight given to
the sales factor will reduce the percentage of the taxpayer's in-
come assigned to the state. As a key economic advisor to the
99. See Michael, supra note 91, at 190-91 (discussing the confusion in de-
termining standards to avoid discrimination in state tax credits).
100. See 1 Multistate Corp. Income Tax Guide (CCH), supra note 59, 146
(charting apportionment formulas used by various states).
101. See 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE
TAXATION 8.06 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the development of three-factor
formula for determing the division of capital stock and net income taxes).
102. See UNIFORM DrVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT §§ 10-17,
7A U.L.A. 331, 349-55 (1985).
103. Under a three-factor formula with a double-weighted sales -factor, a
taxpayer's income is attributed to the state on the basis of a percentage de-
termined by adding up the taxpayer's property factor, its payroll factor, and
twice its sales factor and dividing the total by four. Of the 46 taxing authori-
ties (45 states and the District of Columbia) with corporate net income taxes,
roughly half now employ apportionment formulas that give more weight to the
sales factor than to other apportionment factors. See 1 Multistate Corp. In-
come Tax Guide (CCH) supra note 59, 146.
104. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2734.05, 77-2734.16 (1990).
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Governor of Georgia observed in explaining the state's adoption
of a double-weighted sales factor, the legislation:
offer[s] economic incentives for business expansions and locations
here ....
By promoting the activities of firms that have a physical pres-
ence-property and labor-in Georgia, [the legislation] should clearly
have a stimulative effect.'
Something the Governor's advisor did not say, but which is
equally true, is that giving additional weight to the sales factor
increases the Georgia apportionment percentage for multistate
taxpayers with sales spread throughout the nation (including
Georgia) but whose property and payroll are located in other
states.
The evils of an income tax apportionment formula that ac-
cords disproportionate weight to the sales factor were articu-
lated by Justice Powell in his critique of the extreme version of
such a formula-Iowa's single-factor sales formula-which ig-
nores property and payroll altogether:
Iowa's use of a single-factor sales formula-though facially neu-
tral--operates as a tariff on goods manufactured in other States and
as a subsidy to Iowa manufacturers selling their goods outside of
Iowa ....
This surcharge on Iowa sales increases to the extent that a busi-
ness' plant and labor force are located outside Iowa. It can be
avoided altogether only by locating all property and payroll in Iowa;
an Iowa manufacturer selling only in Iowa will never have any por-
tion of income attributed to any other State. And to the extent that
an Iowa manufacturer makes its sales in States other than Iowa, its
overall state tax liability will be reduced. Assuming comparable tax
rates, its liability to other States, in which sales constitute only one-
third of the apportionment formula, will be far less than the amount
of sales in Iowa, where sales are the exclusive mode of apportioning
income. The effect of Iowa's formula, then, is to penalize out-of-state
manufacturers for selling in Iowa and to subsidize Iowa manufacturers
for selling in other States.l °6
105. Georgia Department of Revenue, Passage of House Bill 50 Revamps
Corporate Apportionment in Ga., GA. REVENUE Q., 1995, at 1 (quoting Dr.
Henry Thomassen, economic advisor to Governor Zell Miller). Expressing
similar sentiments, politicians and business groups in Massachusetts and
Michigan have supported legislation to change their three-factor formulas
with a double-weighted sales factor to a single-factor sales formula. See Mas-
sachusetts: House Speaker Warms to Single Sales Factor, 9 STATE TAX NOTES
895 (1995); Massachusetts: Governor Launches Drive for Single Sales Factor, 9
STATE TAX NOTES 748 (1995); Michigan: Single Sales Factor Bill Creates Con-
troversy, 9 STATE TANOTES 896 (1995).
106. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1978) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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Justice Powell's characterization of Iowa's taxing regime
suggests that it should fail to pass muster under the Court's
state tax incentive decisions. The Iowa scheme "forecloses tax-
neutral decisions" 107 by offering a reduction in state tax liabil-
ity to manufacturers who locate their property and payroll in
Iowa. Furthermore, it "penalize[s] out-of-state manufacturers
for selling in Iowa"108 if they do not yield to Iowa's pressure to
locate their property and payroll there.109 Justice Powell's cri-
tique of the Iowa formula, however, was made in dissent.
Is the Court's rejection of Justice Powell's analysis in
Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair"10 incompatible with the
Court's state tax incentive decisions? Not if they are given a
proper reading. Rather, Moorman pointedly supports the cen-
tral assertion advanced above: that the Court's tax incentive
decisions neither should be nor can be applied by giving their
broadest pronouncements a literal interpretation.
In Moorman, the Court declined the taxpayer's invitation
to hold that Iowa, rather than states which had adopted the
three-factor formula, "was necessarily at fault in a constitu-
tional sense""' for causing the multiple taxation that allegedly
resulted from the coexistence of the three-factor and single-
factor formulas. Because there was no proof in the record as to
precisely where the taxpayer's income was earned, the invali-
dation of the Iowa formula would have had to rest on "the im-
portance of avoiding any risk of duplication in the taxable in-
come of an interstate concern"1 2 in light of the existing pattern
of other states' taxing statutes. But the "only conceivable con-
stitutional basis" for so holding "would be that the Commerce
Clause prohibits any overlap in the computation of taxable in-
come by the States.""3 Whatever the merits of such a rule as a
matter of national policy, the Court concluded that the power
to establish uniform rules for the division of income lay with
Congress, not the Court, and it therefore refused to constitu-
tionalize the three-factor formula.
107. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977).
108. Moorman, 437 U.S. at 284 (Powell, J., dissenting).
109. Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 400-01 (1984)
(analyzing a New York statute and concluding that it "'provide[s] a positive
incentive for increased business activity in New York
State,'. . . but. . . penalizes increases in... activities in other States").
110. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
111. Id. at 277.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 278.
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Notwithstanding the legitimate criticisms that may be
leveled against the Court's tolerance of Iowa's single-factor
sales formula,'14 the formula does not offend the two core val-
ues that underlie the Court's state tax incentive decisions.
First, a single-factor sales formula does not favor in-state over
out-of-state activities,"5 unless one takes account of the taxing
statutes of other states. As noted above, however, the Court
generally has refused to consider other states' taxing regimes
in determining the constitutionality of one state's taxing stat-
ute.116 Moreover, insofar as the Court has taken account of the
possibility of multiple taxation by ascertaining whether a tax
passes the "internal consistency" test 1t7-Iowa's taxing statute
passes that standard with flying colors. If every state imposed
a single-factor sales formula, the interstate enterprise would be
subject to taxes no more burdensome than those imposed upon
competing local enterprises. Rather, both intrastate and inter-
state firms would be subject to tax on 100%, but only 100%, of
their income.
Second, a single-factor sales formula does not implicate the
coercive power of the state by linking a reduction in the state's
taxes to the conduct of in-state activity. Even assuming a tax-
payer has existing income-producing activity within a state
that has adopted a single-factor sales formula, the taxpayer's
relocation of its property and payroll to the state offers no as-
surance that its in-state liability will be reduced. Indeed, if the
taxpayer's in-state and out-of-state sales remain constant,
shifting the taxpayer's property and payroll into the state will
have no effect on the percentage of the taxpayer's income as-
signed to the state. The single-factor sales formula provides a
lure to the multistate taxpayer not because it is coercive in any
way, but because it capitalizes on the tax systems adopted by
other states. This fact may render the single-factor sales for-
mula problematic, but it does not render the formula unconsti-
tutional under the Court's tax incentive decisions.
114 See 1 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 101, 8.8[2][b].
115. Indeed, Justice Powell himself recognized that Iowa's single-factor
sales formula was "facially neutral." Moorman, 437 U.S. 267 at 283 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
116. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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B. PROPERTY TAX INCENTIVES
In contrast to income tax incentives, many property tax in-
centives will pass constitutional muster unless one reads the
Court's state tax incentive opinions as condemning any tax
provision that tilts business decisionmaking toward in-state
investment. Under this criterion, property tax incentives
would fail to survive scrutiny because they are tied to in-state
investment and thus preclude business decisionmaking "solely
on the basis of nontax criteria." 18 Under my more circum-
scribed view of the Court's decisions, however, property tax in-
centives should withstand Commerce Clause review if they do
not favor in-state over out-of-state investment and do not im-
plicate the coercive power of the state.
Property tax incentives that offer an exemption or abate-
ment for new investment in the state (without collateral re-
quirements discrete from the use or location of the property it-
self)119 will survive scrutiny under these criteria. They do not
favor in-state over out-of-state investment, if one assumes-as
one ought to-that other states have adopted taxing regimes
similar to the one in question. 120 Nor do they implicate the co-
ercive power of the state, since a taxpayer does not reduce its
otherwise applicable in-state property tax liability by acquiring
property in the state. Rather, the taxpayer avoids only addi-
tional in-state tax liability by acquiring the property in ques-
tion, just as it would if it acquired property in some other
state.
121
118. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977); see
supra Part ILA (outlining the Court's holding and reasoning in Boston Stock
Exchange).
119. See infra notes 124-125 and accompanying text (distinguishing be-
tween property tax incentives for new in-state investments with collateral re-
quirements independent to the use or location of the property and incentives
without such collateral requirements).
120. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (providing two sources
that support the notion that the taxing power of a state should not depend on
taxing statutes of other states).
121. A recent Pennsylvania decision supports my thesis that property tax
incentives of this nature will pass muster under the Commerce Clause. In
PPG Indus., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 824 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995),
affd, 681 A.2d 832 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996), the court sustained a capital stock
tax exemption limited to "the capital stock of entities organized for manufac-
turing, processing, research or development purposes which is invested in and
actually and exclusively employed in carrying on manufacturing, processing,
research or development within the state." See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §
7602(a) (West Supp. 1996). The taxpayer, only some of whose manufacturing
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This is not to suggest that all property tax incentives may
be implemented with constitutional impunity. Property tax in-
centives will be in constitutional jeopardy within the adjudica-
tive framework proposed above when they are tied to in-state
activity apart from investment in the property itself. For ex-
ample, property tax incentives limited to businesses that cre-
ate a certain number of new jobs in the state or that make
other investments of a certain magnitude in the state run afoul
of the principle that a state may not limit tax incentives to
those with a specified economic presence in the state12--at
least when the economic presence does not constitute the very
tax base that the state is seeking to attract. Such property tax
incentives suffer from the infirmity that they link the tax
benefit-exemption from local property taxes-to local activity
that is discrete from the investment in the in-state property.
Consequently, they violate the rule that a state may not use its
taxing power to coerce taxpayers to engage in in-state activity.123
activities were carried on in the state, attacked the exemption on the ground
that it discriminated against interstate commerce. Relying on Westinghouse
and Boston Stock Exchange, the taxpayer argued that there is a discrimina-
tory effect upon multistate corporations with a low proportion of manufactur-
ing within Pennsylvania who are allegedly placed at a commercial disadvan-
tage to those businesses which conduct more of their manufacturing within
the state.
The court rejected this argument on the ground that the tax exemption
was coterminous with the tax base and that there was no tax cost to the tax-
payer in conducting economic activity across state lines. As the court ob-
served:
Once the capital stock is apportioned to ... Pennsylvania, then a
manufacturing exemption applies to exempt property within the
state that is related to manufacturing within the state. Both the tax
and the exemption is [sic] based on in-state property and does not af-
fect out-of-state property. The fact that a proportion of the corporate
headquarters is taxed is a result of locating the corporate headquar-
ters within the Commonwealth, not on locating some or most of the
manufacturing out-of-state. Regardless of the location of the manu-
facturing, nothing moving in interstate commerce is affected by the
exemption.
PPG Indus. 681 A.2d at 830. The coures decision is significant in that it re-
fuses to extend the teachings of cases like Westinghouse and Boston Stock Ex-
change beyond their proper limits.
122. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756-57 (1981); Northwest
Aerospace Training Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, (Minn. Tax Ct. Apr. 4,
1995) [2 Minn.] State Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 202-603.
123. The Coures decision in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848(1996), illustrates this distinction. In Fulton, the Court struck down a North
Carolina intangible property tax that varied inversely with the corporations
presence in North Carolina. Prior to the levy's repeal in late 1995, North
Carolina imposed an intangible property tax on, among other things, shares of
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These tax incentives in effect say to the taxpayer that the
state will refrain from imposing taxes on the taxpayer's prop-
erty only if, in addition to acquiring property in the state, the
taxpayer invests a certain amount of money in the state, or
hires a certain number of employees in the state, or conducts
operations of a certain size in the state. These incentives are
distinguishable from those described earlier, which in effect
say to the taxpayer that the state will not issue the taxpayer a
property tax bill if it acquires in-state property that meets
stock owned by resident individuals and corporations and on shares of stock
having a business situs in the state. The tax was imposed at the rate of 0.25%
of the fair market value of the stock. The value of the stock assessed under
the tax, however, was reduced by a percentage equal to the percentage of the
corporation's income subject to tax in North Carolina. This percentage was
determined by the familiar three-factor income apportionment formula of
property, payroll, and sales.
Under this taxing regime, the stock of a corporation doing all of its busi-
ness in North Carolina would be subject to no North Carolina's intangible
property tax. Such a corporation would have a 100% income tax apportion-
ment percentage which would, in turn, permit a 100% reduction in the value
of the corporation's stock subject to tax in the hands of its shareholders. Con-
versely, the stock of a corporation doing no business in North Carolina would
pay an intangible property tax measured by all of the stocks value. Such a
corporation would have a zero percent income tax apportionment percentage
which would, in turn, permit no reduction in the value of the corporation's
stock subject to tax in the hands of its shareholders.
North Carolina's intangible tax regime plainly discriminated on its face
against interstate commerce. As the Court observed in Fulton, "A regime that
taxes stock only to the degree that its issuing corporation participates in in-
terstate commerce favors domestic corporations over their foreign competitors
in raising capital among North Carolina residents and tends, at least, to dis-
courage domestic corporations from plying their trades in interstate com-
merce." Id. at 855. Indeed, the only disputed question in the case was
whether the facially discriminatory tax could be saved by the "compensatory"
or "complementary" tax doctrine, see generally Walter Hellerstein, Comple-
mentary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State Tax Discrimination, 39
TAX LAW. 405 (1986), and the Court held it could not.
For present purposes, Fulton is instructive in revealing the fault line be-
tween property tax incentives that will survive or fail to survive Commerce
Clause scrutiny. A tax exemption available to any taxpayer which brings its
property into the state will pass muster because it does not "discourage...
corporations from plying their trades in interstate commerce," Fulton, 116 S.
Ct. at 855; it merely lowers the cost of doing business in intrastate commerce,
see supra note 121. By contrast, a tax exemption like that offered by North
Carolina in Fulton will violate the Commerce Clause because it demands not
only that the taxpayer bring its corporate stock into North Carolina (which
any resident owner is deemed to do), but, in addition, that the corporation
conduct its business in North Carolina. It is this collateral requirement-
tying the exemption to the corporation's activity in state-that condemns the
exemption under the Commerce Clause.
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specified conditions regarding the use or location of the prop-
erty itself.
It might be argued that the proposed distinction between
defensible and indefensible property tax incentives is semantic
and unworkable. Thus one might contend that property tax
exemptions for property constructed within the state for specified
purposes (for example, new manufacturing facilities) or in
specified locations (for example, enterprise zones) require some
in-state activity "apart from the investment in the property it-
self." It is true, of course, that property tax incentives that of-
fer an exemption or abatement for new investment in the state
invariably require some in-state activity "apart from the in-
vestment in the property itself," namely, that the investment
be for the legislatively prescribed in-state purpose and no
other. I nevertheless believe that there is a significant differ-
ence between relieving a taxpayer of a property tax burden or-
dinarily associated with ownership of property when the tax-
payer acquires property under conditions that depend on the
use or location of the property itself and relieving a taxpayer of
a property tax burden ordinarily associated with ownership of
property when the taxpayer acquires property under conditions
that do not depend on the use or location of the property itself.
In the former case, the taxpayer is required to engage in no in-
state activity that fairly can be characterized as independent of
the acquisition and disposition of the property. In the latter
case, the taxpayer is required to engage in in-state activity that
it might undertake even if it had never invested in the prop-
erty (for example, creating a certain number of jobs in the state
or making in-state investments of a certain magnitude).
The suggested distinction is hardly a stranger to the dor-
mant Commerce Clause field. Indeed, both the Court and
commentators have suggested the constitutional infirmity of
"downstream restraints" placed on the recipient of a state-
conferred benefit, including state subsidies." 4 There is no rea-
124 See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96-98
(1984); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 11 (1928); Dan T.
Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Com-
merce Clauses, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 463-73 (1989) (observing that the mar-
ket-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause is confined to
cases in which the state does not impose "downstream restraints" on in-state
preferences); Walter Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce
Clause, and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 76-79
(arguing that state power to distribute state-owned resources does not extend
to conditions on disposition that "independently burden" interstate commerce).
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son why the same sort of restriction should not apply as forcefully
to state-conferred tax breaks. To be sure, the "independent ac-
tivity" standard will engender some difficulties in application.
But this is hardly surprising because "it is an essential part of
adjudication to draw distinctions, including fine ones, in the
process of interpreting the Constitution."125
In any event, in the real world, property tax incentives
seldom impose any conditions other than those linked to the
use or location of the property itself.1 26 Accordingly, they will
rarely be vulnerable to the objection that they are exacting, as
the price of relief from property taxes, the conduct of in-state
activity independent of the investment in the property.
C. SALES AND SIMILAR TRANSACTION TAx INCENTIVES
Analysis of the constitutionality of sales and similar
transaction tax incentives should track the analysis of property
tax incentives offered above. If one reads the Court's state tax
incentive opinions as condemning any tax provision that influ-
ences business decision-making, every sales or similar trans-
action tax incentive tied to the conduct of in-state activity lies
in the constitutional danger zone. -127  In my view, however,
sales and similar transaction tax incentives-like all other tax
incentives-ought to survive Commerce Clause scrutiny if they
do not favor in-state over out-of-state activity or implicate the
coercive power of the state. Many sales and similar transac-
tion tax incentives will pass this test.
For example, sales and use tax exemptions, credits, or re-
funds for property purchased for construction of new facilities
in the state (or for use in connection with the relocation of a
business in the state, or for use in an enterprise zone in the
state)128 are unobjectionable under these criteria. They do not
favor in-state over out-of-state activity, unless one indulges the
assumption-unwarranted under general principles of Com-
merce Clause analysis-that other states will tax the same
125. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 679 (1970); see, e.g., United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act
by distinguishing it from statutes targeted to economic intrastate activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce).
126. See [2 All States] State Tax Guide (CCH) supra note 63, 20-200 to
20-964 (listing all property taxes and exemptions by state).
127. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the Coures state tax incentive opin-
ions).
128. See generally 1 Multistate Sales Tax Guide (CCH) supra note 59,
975 (listing state tax incentives for investment in industry).
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transaction if it were effectuated in those states.1 29 Nor do
these tax breaks implicate the coercive power of the state. A
taxpayer does not reduce its in-state tax liability by purchasing
property for use within the state. It merely ensures that there
will be no in-state tax cost from engaging in the transaction,
just as there would be no in-state cost if it engaged in the
transaction in some other state.
This does not mean that all sales and transaction tax in-
centives are constitutionally unobjectionable. The Court's de-
cisions in Boston Stock Exchange, Bacchus, and New Energy
establish that such incentives may well be vulnerable to consti-
tutional attack. A number of sales and similar transaction tax
incentives are constitutionally suspect under the analysis ar-
ticulated above: specifically, those sales and similar transac-
tion tax exemptions, credits, or refunds that are tied to in-state
activity apart from the in-state use of the property or services
with respect to which the tax is imposed.
Consider, for example, Arizona's law that grants a refund
of transaction privilege taxes for motion picture companies that
spend more than $1 million per year in the state to produce one
or more motion pictures in the state; 30 or Arkansas' exemption
from sales and use taxes of purchases of natural gas and elec-
tricity by steel mill operators that invest over $120 million in
an Arkansas steel mill; 31 or Illinois' exemption from sales and
use taxes of purchases of certain property used by businesses
that make investments of at least $40 million in the state or
that create a minimum of 200 jobs in the state; 3 2 or Nebraska's
provision for refund of sales and use taxes for certain busi-
nesses that increase employment by two full-time employees in
the state and that make specified minimum investments in the
state;133 or New Mexico's credits for sales or use taxes paid for
purchases of qualified equipment incorporated into a manufac-
turing operation if the taxpayer employs one additional full-
time employee in the state for every $250,000 in value of
qualified equipment invested in the state; 34 or Oklahoma's ex-
emption from sales and use taxes for purchases of tangible per-
129. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (arguing that the taxing
power of a state should not depend on the taxing statutes of other states).
130. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1322.01 (Supp. 1995).
13L See ARM CODE ANN. §§ 26-52-901 (Michie 1992, Supp. 1995).
132. See ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. ch. 35, 120/lf (Smith-Hurd 1993).
133. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-27,188 (1996).
134. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9A-7.1 (Michie 1997).
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sonal property by a qualified manufacturer for incorporation
into a new manufacturing plant in the state if the total cost of
construction exceeds $5 million and at least 100 jobs are cre-
ated and maintained for at least 36 months in the state;'35 or
South Dakota's provision for a credit or refund of contractors'
excise taxes paid for construction of new or expanded manufac-
turing facilities and for sales and use taxes paid for the pur-
chase of business equipment, if the project costs exceed $20
million.' 36
All of these sales and similar transaction tax incentives
share a common constitutional defect: they link the tax bene-
fit-reduction of state sales or similar transaction tax liabil-
ity-to in-state activity that is independent of the use of the
property or services with respect to which the tax is imposed.
Consequently, they all offend the fundamental principle that a
state may not use its taxing power to coerce taxpayers to en-
gage in in-state activity. These tax incentives-like the income
tax credits and deductions discussed above137 -in effect tell the
taxpayer that the state will release its grip on the taxpayer's
tax dollars associated with transactions consummated in the
state only if the taxpayer invests a certain amount of money in
the state, or hires a certain number of employees in the state,
or conducts operations of a certain size in the state.138 Such in-
135. See OKA. STAT. tit. 68, §1359(8) (Supp. 1997).
136. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-45B-1 (Supp. 1996).
137. See supra Parts IV-A.l-2.
138. A recent Minnesota case is illustrative. In Northwest Aerospace Train-
ing Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, (Minn. Tax Ct. Apr. 4, 1995) [2 Minn.]
St. Tax Rep. (CCH) I 202-603, Minnesota provided an exemption from its
sales and use tax on the receipts from the lease of airflight equipment to air-
line companies that paid the Minnesota flight property tax. The flight prop-
erty tax is paid only by airline companies that make three or more flights per
year into Minnesota. A lessor of flight equipment to federal agencies and mis-
cellaneous third parties, who did not pay the flight property tax, challenged
the exemption on the grounds that it discriminated against interstate com-
merce in violation of the Commerce Clause. In sustaining the objection, the
court, citing Boston Stock Exchange and Westinghouse, declared:
All United States domestic airlines who pay the Flight Property
Tax are exempt from the sales tax when they rent airflight equip-
ment. The Flight Property Tax is paid by all United States domestic
airline companies who make three or more trips into or out of Minne-
sota during a calendar year. Payers of the Flight Property Tax typi-
cally have employees and equipment in Minnesota and lease airport
facilities in Minnesota....
A United States domestic airline must pay Flight Property Tax to
escape sales tax on rentals of airflight equipment. In effect, an air-
line is forced to establish an economic presence in Minnesota to es-
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centives are therefore distinguishable from the benign form of
transaction tax incentives described above which in effect say
to the taxpayer that the state will not even seek to establish a
grip on its tax dollars if the taxpayer consummates a transac-
tion in the state, so long as the property or services with re-
spect to which the tax is imposed are dedicated to the pre-
scribed in-state use.
It might be argued, along the lines advanced above in the
context of property tax incentives, that the distinction I have
drawn between defensible and indefensible sales and similar
transaction tax lacks substance. Thus, one might contend that
there is no real distinction between, say, a sales tax exemption
for property purchased for use in new facilities in the state and
a sales tax exemption for property purchased in a facility that
creates ten new jobs in a state. In each case, one may argue,
there is a requirement that the taxpayer engage in some in-
state activity apart from the taxable transaction itself, namely,
that the property must be purchased for the defined purpose
and for no other. Accordingly, the argument goes, the state in
each case is exerting its tax power over the taxable transaction
(i.e., the sale) to "coerce" the taxpayer to engage in some dis-
crete in-state activity (use of the property in a new facility or
use of the property in a facility that creates ten new jobs).
While it is true that there are conditions imposed upon
tax-favored in-state transactions that I have characterized as
constitutional apart from the naked act of making an in-state
purchase, I believe, as explained in the context of property tax
incentives, that the distinction I have drawn between the two
categories of incentives is meaningful. There is a significant
difference between relieving a taxpayer of a tax obligation or-
dinarily due upon a sale when the taxpayer puts the property
sold to a particular in-state use or employs it in a particular in-
state location and relieving a taxpayer of a tax obligation ordi-
narily due upon a sale when the taxpayer engages in in-state
activity that does not depend on the use or location of the prop-
erty sold. In the former case, the taxpayer is not required to
engage in any in-state activity that fairly can be characterized
as independent of the acquisition and disposition of the prop-
erty itself. In the latter case, the taxpayer is required to en-
cape the tax. A United States domestic airline which does not estab-
lish an economic presence in Minnesota is placed at a competitive
disadvantage because it is forced to pay the [lessor's] lease rate for
use of flight training equipment and a sales tax.
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gage in in-state activity that it might undertake even if it had
never purchased the property (for example, creating a certain
number of jobs in the state or making in-state investments of a
certain magnitude).
CONCLUSION
Whatever one may say about state tax incentives as a mat-
ter of social or economic policy, they plainly raise serious
doubts as a matter of federal constitutional law. Perhaps this
is not surprising, since the defining issues of public policy often
emerge as questions of constitutional law. In this article, I
have argued that many existing state tax incentives violate the
Commerce Clause bar against discriminatory taxation of inter-
state state commerce because (1) they favor in-state over out-
of-state activity and (2) they do so through the coercive ma-
chinery of the state. I have also suggested, however, that other
state tax incentives that do not offend these two principles
should survive Commerce Clause scrutiny, even though the
language of some of the Court's tax incentive opinions can be
read to condemn even these more benign incentives.
In any event, the burgeoning use of state and local tax in-
centives ensures that constitutional challenges will increas-
ingly find their way into the courts. And when they do, courts
may well end the "race to the bottom" or at least significantly
reduce its pace.
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